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ABSTRACT: Using hand-collected data on analyst coverage decisions, we study how changes 
in reporting frequency affect analyst coverage decisions for European firms along with the 
impact on their forecast performance. Following the enactment of the Transparency Directive, 
we find that analysts’ expertise, with respect to greater reporting frequency, significantly 
influences the coverage decision. Particularly, analysts, with higher levels of disclosure 
expertise,  are 150% more likely to initiate new coverage for firms that increase their disclosure 
frequency. Moreover, we identify that this type of analyst primarily produces firm-specific 
information as their initiations lead to increased firm-specific volatility, which signals more 
information-laden stock prices. Subsequently, analysts also provide significantly more accurate 
forecast on firms with changes in their reporting frequency. Overall, our findings indicate that 
reporting frequency not only directly impacts the available information about a firm, but also 
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 1. Introduction  
Despite sharp variation in financial reporting frequency across the world, there is only limited 
research on the implications of this variation for capital market participants (Butler, Kraft, & 
Weiss, 2007; Yee, 2004; Cuijpers & Peek, 2010). In this study, we examine whether financial 
reporting frequency affects information intermediaries and their decision-making. Our focus 
on information intermediaries aims to complement the recent research on the real effects of 
reporting frequency for managers and investors, which mostly suggests that more frequent 
reporting induces myopic behavior and investments decisions (Fu, Kraft, & Zhang, 2012; 
Ernstberger, Link, Stich, & Vogler, 2017; Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra, & Venugopalan, 2014). 
While these findings have been used in the recent policy debates against quarterly reporting 
legislation, extant research provides little insight into the consequences for analysts arising 
from reporting frequency changes and the related effect on companies’ information 
environments. We seek to fill this gap and aim to identify how reporting frequency changes 
affect analyst-specific information advantages and their impact on analysts’ coverage and 
termination decisions. More specifically, we investigate the coverage decision and forecasts 
accuracy of analysts around the introduction of the Transparency Directive (TD), a regulatory 
change imposed by the European Union (EU) between 2004 and 2007, which involved a 
reporting frequency increase for publicly listed companies in the EU. In our setting we exploit 
this exogenous shock and differentiate analysts, prior to the TD introduction, based on the 
composition of their coverage portfolio. This differentiation into “frequent” and “infrequent” 
analysts is based on the proportion of quarterly-reporting firms in analysts’ portfolios and aims 
to proxy for the Post-TD coverage incentives of analysts. Particularly, the analyst type indicates 
the analyst’s expertise with firms of the corresponding reporting frequency.   
Ex ante, we expect the reporting frequency change, induced by the Transparency 
Directive, to affect the analyst types and their coverage decisions in different ways. On the one 
hand, the enhanced information environment should benefit analysts with respect to their 
coverage decisions and forecasting performance. Specifically, the relative expertise in 
environments with greater levels of public information should enable frequent analysts to 
obtain information in a more timely and cost-efficient manner relative to the other analysts 
(Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2003). Similarly, prior literature also suggests that these analysts are 
better able to identify and complement the current information mix (firm-, industry- and 
market-specific information) incorporated in the stock price of a firm due to their prior 
expertise with quarterly-reporting firms (Crawford, Roulstone, & So, 2012). On the other hand, 
frequent analysts could lose their relative information advantage with the introduction of the 
 Transparency Directive. Specifically, the regulatory change may influence their ability to 
gather value-relevant information, by inducting a general increase in disclosure 
informativeness. In other words, the lower information asymmetry may reduce analysts’ ability 
to differentiate themselves from other analysts. Lang and Lundholm (1996) support this 
prediction and indicate that greater and more frequent voluntary disclosure policies improve 
forecast performance of analysts. While forecast performance improvements provide benefits 
to the other capital market participants, the convergence in forecast dispersion and accuracy 
also indicates that fewer differentiation opportunities exist for analysts. This effect on 
differentiation can result from decreases in ability differences among analysts, reductions in 
information acquisition costs, or both.  
Similar to the frequent analysts, the predictions for infrequent analysts are mixed. More 
specifically, prior studies suggest that greater information asymmetry increases the investment 
value of private (firm-specific) information, which suggests that infrequent analysts most likely 
differentiate themselves through the acquisition of firm-specific information (Liu, 2011). 
However, regulatory changes (i.e.; Transparency Directive, IFRS introduction and/or SOX) 
may influence the costliness of such information. As a consequence, the change in information 
acquisition costs may diminish the benefits for these analysts and consequently, the incentives 
to cover the respective firms. This prediction also follows Frankel & Li (2004), who show that 
financial statement informativeness limits the ability to profit from private information. The 
authors reason that the limitation mainly stems from the enhanced competition that follows 
such regulatory changes. Moreover, the prior experience of infrequent analysts, relative to 
frequent analysts, results in lower levels of disclosure frequency expertise to cope with the 
post-TD adaptation (Clement, 1999). As a result, infrequent analysts may incur higher costs 
(i.e., time and effort), to manage the change in reporting frequency, which can negatively affect 
coverage decisions and subsequent forecasting performance. Nonetheless, several studies 
provide evidence that a decrease in information asymmetry increases the likelihood of coverage 
(Derrien & Kecskés, 2013; Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2004). Specifically, the enhanced information 
environment could outweigh the lack of disclosure frequency expertise of infrequent analysts 
and as a consequence, increase coverage likelihood. By comparing frequent versus infrequent 
analysts, we intent to isolate the informational advantage effect of analysts that result from 
changes in the information environment, on their coverage (termination) decisions and 
forecasting performance. 
Our setting exploits the staggered adoption of the TD by publicly-listed EU companies 
over the period 2003–2013. Importantly, prior to the TD, numerous firms already disclose 
 information on a quarterly basis. Most of these firms either disclose quarterly on a voluntary 
basis or due to the cross-listing requirement of the US. Respectively, these firms and the 
staggered timing of disclosure frequency changes provide us with a natural control group of 
companies to employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis.  
Using I/B/E/S and hand-collected data1 on firms’ reporting frequency, we find that 
greater analyst expertise with respect to quarterly reporting settings (i.e., frequent analysts) 
increases the likelihood that an analyst will initiate coverage on a firm that switches to quarterly 
reporting after the TD. Moreover, these analysts are also significantly less likely to terminate 
the coverage of firms that increase their reporting frequency following the TD. With respect to 
the infrequent analysts, we find that they are less (more) likely to initiate (terminate) coverage 
on firms that change their reporting frequency in response to the TD. To collaborate our results, 
we further condition our analysis on the existing level of coverage at the time of an initiation 
to provide insight into whether the analyst types have different incentives to gather firm- versus 
industry- and/or market information. More specifically, following Crawford, Roulstone and So 
(2012), the analysis focuses on two different kinds of coverage levels. One the one hand, an 
analyst that initiates coverage on a firm without prior coverage will most likely provide low-
cost market and industry information, whereas subsequent analysts will primarily provide firm-
specific information to distinguish themselves from existing analysts. The corresponding 
results confirm that frequent analyst primarily collect and incorporate firm-specific 
information for firms that change their reporting frequency. In particular, the analysis of the 
coverage decision, based on the existing coverage level (non-existent versus existing), shows 
that frequent analysts primarily engage in subsequent initiations (e.g.; prior analyst coverage) 
that increase the amount of firm-specific information in the stock price formation. 
Subsequently, we show that the frequent analysts also provide significantly more accurate 
forecast for reporting frequency changing firms. Specifically, the forecast error as well as the 
target price error is significantly lower for frequent analysts that cover firms that increase 
reporting frequency in response to the TD. Overall, this suggests that the reporting frequency 
change enables frequent analysts to strategically use their relative information advantage, with 
respect to the disclosure frequency, in their coverage decisions, which subsequently also affects 
their forecast performance. Hence, our study shows that disclosure frequency changes affect 
 
1Missing reporting frequency data has been hand-collected via LexisNexis and financial statement 
information. 
 the information environment of treated firms and respectively, the analysts’ coverage decisions 
and forecast performance. While previous studies (Derrien & Kecskés, 2013; Gilson, Healy, 
Noe, & Palepu, 2001; Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2004) indicate a universal increase in coverage 
after information asymmetry decreases, we provide evidence that the relative information 
advantage of certain analysts, with respect to their reporting frequency expertise, significantly 
influences coverage decisions and forecast accuracy. We provide robustness tests to account 
for the deregulation of the TD in 2015.  
We directly expand on the disclosure frequency literature by examining how reporting 
frequency changes affects coverage and termination decisions of analysts. Specifically, the 
findings provide additional input to the current regulatory debate in the US with respect to the 
abolishment of quarterly earnings reports. In particular, we show how disclosure frequency 
changes affect information intermediaries, which play an important role in capital markets. Not 
only do they provide additional information to other capital market participants, but they also 
create substantial firm value in various ways (e.g., Irani & Oesch, 2013; Li & You, 2015; 
Altınkılıç, Balashov, & Hansen, 2013; Bradley, Clarke, Lee, & Ornthanalai, 2014). As part of 
this study, we identify and measure attributes of the analyst-firm pairs, including disclosure 
frequency, our main dependent variable, as well as other determinants such as the analyst's 
industry specialization, portfolio compositions and brokerage characteristics. This focus allows 
us to capture variation in these traits both cross-sectionally and over time. As all of our 
measures are analysts-specific, we focus on the analysts’ perspective when investigating the 
coverage decision. Third, we synthesize prior studies and examine the potential incentive 
channels of coverage behavior in a multivariate setting, following an exogenous shock. Using 
this research design, we provide compelling evidence that analysts create value for the firms 
they cover and strategically initiate based on their informational advantage. Lastly, we provide 
new evidence that the strategic coverage choice also matches the subsequent forecasting 
performance of these analysts. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Barron, Kim, Lim, & 
Stevens, 1998; Clement, 1999), we document better forecasting performance for analysts that 
initiate new coverage on firms with reporting frequency changes in the post-TD period.  
 
The remaining parts of the paper are structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 illustrates the data and sample selection 
procedures. Section 4 displays the empirical results of the various analyses. Section 5 follows 
up with the discussion of the results, and Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
 2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Disclosure differences across accounting standards  
Undoubtedly, analysts face a trade-off situation when deciding to cover firms in different 
information environments. These differences result from the numerous accounting standards 
across the world and their dissimilarities with respect to disclosure policies and other 
regulations. In particular, analysts need to assess and evaluate their coverage choice when 
deciding between firms with differing disclosure frequency and quality. For instance, Lang, 
Lins, & Miller (2004) investigate the relationship between analyst following, investor 
protection, and valuation. They find that analysts are less likely to follow firms with potential 
incentives to withhold or manipulate information, including family firms and firms in low 
shareholder-protection countries. These findings imply that the regulatory environment and its 
influence on information asymmetry has a significant impact on analysts’ likelihood to cover 
a certain firm. Similarly, Tan, Wang, & Welker (2011) investigate whether the mandated 
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) affects the coverage behavior 
of financial analysts. In particular, the authors find that mandatory IFRS adoption attracts 
foreign analysts, particularly those from countries that are simultaneously adopting IFRS along 
with the covered firm's country and those with prior IFRS experience. Moreover, they find that 
the respective coverage coincides with superior forecasting behavior. Overall, the findings 
suggest that disclosure improvements enable analysts to better allocate their resources and 
make more informed decisions. Similarly, several scholars also address disclosure changes 
associated with cross-listing on foreign exchanges. Commonly, the literature focuses on US 
exchanges due to the comprehensive accounting regulation and strong legal enforcement. For 
instance, Lang, Lins, & Miller (2003) investigate the relation between cross-listing in the US 
and the information environments of cross-listers (i.e., non-US firms). They hypothesize that 
cross-listed firms experience significant improvements in their information environment due 
to the difference in accounting standards. Their findings confirm this prediction and show that 
non-US firms benefit from greater analyst coverage and more accurate forecast performance, 
which  improves market valuations. We build on this premise and apply the regulatory 
implications and effects on the information environment of analysts in a European setting. 
More specifically, we predict that frequent analysts, relative to infrequent analysts, attain an 
informational advantage with respect to covering quarterly-reporting firms. This advantage 
mainly derives from analysts’ experience in quarterly-reporting settings. Clemens (1999) 
supports this claim, by attempting to explain the differences in analysts’ earnings forecast 
accuracy. He finds that forecast accuracy is positively associated with analysts’ experience (a 
 proxy for analyst ability) and negatively associated with the existing analyst coverage 
(indicator for task complexity). Similarly, we predict that knowledge accumulation, with 
respect to reporting frequency, enables analyst to provide more accurate forecast for firms that 
experience increases in disclosure frequency. Overall, previous research suggests that 
regulatory disclosure changes have a significant effect on the information environment of 
capital markets and respectively, influence the decision-making of the respective participants. 
One particular group, financial analysts, have an important information dissemination role. The 
ability to perform this role greatly depends on several characteristics, including ability, 
information intensity and/or geographical proximity (Clement, 1999; Cuijpers & Peek, 2010; 
O'Brien & Tan, 2015).  
 
2.2. Analysts’ Initiations and the Effect on the Information Environment of the Firm 
Despite the voluminous literature on analyst behavior and performance (Clement, 1999; 
Derrien & Kecskés, 2013), the clear incentive behind analysts’ coverage decisions, 
terminations and subsequent market implications still remains unclear. Previous studies 
provide compelling evidence of market responses (e.g. positive and/or negative) after analyst 
initiations and terminations (Piotroski & Roulstone, 2004; Branson, Guffey, & Pagach, 1998). 
In particular, Crawford, Roulstone and So (2012) study how the coverage information 
produced by analysts contributes to the mix of firm-specific, industry-, and market-wide 
information impounded in the stock price of a firm. They hypothesize that the existence or 
absence of prior coverage levels indicate different information types required by the analyst. 
More specifically, analysts that initiate coverage on firm without any prior analyst following, 
will provide low cost market and industry information, whereas subsequent initiations will 
mostly require analysts to accumulate firm-specific information to differentiate their 
contribution from existing information. The authors find that new analyst coverage decisions 
are positively related to the amount of industry- and market-level information impounded into 
stock prices relative to the firm-specific information. In contrast, analysts that initiate 
subsequent coverage primarily emphasize the identification and production of firm-specific 
information. This relation with respect to market and industry information is consistent with 
the study of Piotroski & Roulstone (2004), where they propose that analysts’ ability to extract 
firm-specific information is more costly when compared to the ability of other market 
participants (i.e.; executives and institutions). As a result, analysts are generally more 
specialized in acquiring, interpreting and impounding common industry-wide information into 
stock prices. This notion is also supported by various studies that indicate the tendency of 
 analysts to engage in industry specialization (Gilson, Healy, Noe, & Palepu, 2001). The authors 
further indicate that this mainly results from the markets’ ability to better understand the 
implications of industry- and market-wide information and incorporate this information in a 
timely manner. In other words, if analysts primarily create new information that links firm 
fundamentals to market and industry prospects, then other stakeholders can more confidently 
interpret upward (downward) movements in the market and/or industry as a sign for future firm 
value improvements (reductions). Compared to numerous scholars (e.g., Piotroski & 
Roulstone, 2004; Chan & Hameed, 2006; Durnev, Morck, Yeung, & Zarowin, 2003), who 
positively associate analyst coverage with the amount of industry- and market-information 
impounded in the stock prices, Liu (2011) provides contradicting evidence and displays that 
analysts largely produce firm-specific information. Particularly, the author hypothesizes that 
the greater investment value of firm-specific information outweighs the value of more common 
market- and industry-information. To examine this hypothesis, he splits the stock returns, 
following an increase in analyst coverage, into firm-specific and industry-specific components. 
Specifically, he proxies analysts’ incentive to gather and produce firm-specific information 
with firm’s idiosyncratic volatility. Consequently, the investment value of firm-specific 
information increases with greater idiosyncratic volatility, which incentivizes the analyst to 
gather more information of this type. Similarly, higher (absolute) levels of industry betas and 
lower idiosyncratic volatility encourages analysts to produce more industry-specific 
information. Results show that the initiation-induced stock returns contain, on average, 
significantly greater firm-specific components, relative to the industry-specific components. 
These findings have important implications because these results imply that analysts 
strategically decided what information type to collect. Other studies argue that analysts assess 
what type and amount of information is already impounded in the stock price and adjust their 
coverage decision accordingly (e.g., Piotroski & Roulstone, 2004; Chan & Hameed, 2006; 
Durnev, Morck, Yeung, & Zarowin, 2003; Liu, 2011).  
 
2.3. Analysts’ Information Advantage and their Coverage and Termination Choice 
Irrespective of the initiation timing and respective information type, prior literature (i.e.; 
Clement, 1999; Cuijpers & Peek, 2010; O'Brien & Tan, 2015; Durnev, Morck, Yeung, & 
Zarowin, 2003; Liu, 2011) suggests that the infrequent analysts will most likely lose their 
informational advantage around the introduction of the TD. This mainly results from the TD’s 
objective to improve the information environments and disclosure quality of European firms. 
Further, the TD was expected to improve the transparency of capital markets and provide 
 greater stakeholder protection across all the different financial market environments (European 
Commission, 2004). Correspondingly, the disclosure quality of annually, semi-annually and 
quarterly reporting firms as well as the amount of public information should increase after the 
introduction of the TD. As a result, the regulatory change will reduce the coverage likelihood 
of infrequent analysts or even result in the coverage termination of the respective firms. In 
contrast, the TD should enable frequent analysts to use their information advantage in their 
coverage decision for switching firms (Clemens, 1999; Mikhail, Walther, & Willis, 1997).  
More specifically, frequent analysts, due to their information advantage, strategically 
initiate new coverage on firms that recently changed to a more frequent reporting regime, 
following the TD introduction. Infrequent analysts’ informational advantage will deteriorate 
with the introduction of the TD, which reduces the incentive to initiate coverage for switching 
firms. In alternative form, our first hypothesis is: 
 
H1: Frequent analysts, relative to infrequent analysts, are more likely to initiate coverage on 
firms that experience a reporting frequency change following the TD. 
 
Our second hypothesis focuses on the termination behavior of analysts. Coverage 
terminations can have detrimental effects on firms due to the value-providing role of analysts. 
In particular, literature suggests that analysts add value through (1) improvements in firms 
fundamental performance by monitoring managers (e.g., Irani & Oesch, 2013; Li & You, 
2015), (2) reductions in firms’ cost of capital via decreasing information asymmetry (e.g., 
Branson, Guffey, & Pagach, 1998; Altınkılıç, Balashov, & Hansen, 2013, Bradley, Clarke, Lee, 
& Ornthanalai, 2014), or (3) decreases in firms’ cost of capital through increasing investor 
recognition (Merton, 1987). Consequently, the termination of analysts significantly affects the 
valuation of the firm. An important factor in the termination decision-making process is the fit 
between the analysts’ experience and the information environment of the respective firm. For 
our sample analysts, the firms’ information environments increase with the TD introduction. 
Such changes in the information environment will also influence the analysts’ coverage 
incentives. In our study, frequent analysts most likely prefer these environments, to benefit 
from their expertise with respect to greater reporting frequency. As a consequence, disclosure 
frequency increases will likely expand the benefits of this expertise and respectively, reduce 
the likelihood of terminations for these firms. In contrast, the motivation for infrequent analysts 
is mixed. Following the TD, these analysts have to acquire (additional) reporting-frequency 
specific knowledge to cope with the changes in both the regulatory and information 
 environment. Knowledge acquisition can be both costly and time-intensive, which most 
certainly increases the likelihood to drop the coverage of the respective firms (Liu, 2011). 
However, infrequent analysts also invested substantial amounts of resources to initially obtain 
this knowledge. As a consequence, the coverage termination of the respective firms can be 
even more costly compared to the analysts’ alternatives. Moreover, analysts’ career outcomes 
are also based on coverage and forecast performance. As a result, these analysts might continue 
their coverage, due to the familiarity with these firms, to increase the likelihood of positive 
career outcomes (Wu & Zang, 2009). Respectively, we expect frequent analysts, following the 
gain of their respective disclosure type expertise, to not terminate their coverage of the 
switching firm in the Post-TD period. For infrequent analysts, we expect a similar behavior. 
Particularly, the additional knowledge acquisition costs will most certainly be high, however, 
the initial knowledge acquisition cost, potential negative career outcomes in the future and the 
non-existence of actual coverage alternatives (i.e., all firms will have to switch to this setting) 
will most likely prevail in the termination decision process. Conclusively, our second 
hypothesis is stated the following way:   
 
H2: Frequent analysts, relative to infrequent analysts, are less likely to initiate terminations on 
firm, that experience a reporting frequency change following the TD. 
 
2.4. Forecast Performance of Different Analyst Types 
After investigating the relationship between disclosure frequency experience and coverage 
decision performance, we complement prior research findings by Clement (1999) and Jacob, 
Lys, & Neale (1999) regarding ability, general experience, and firm-specific experience and 
how they affect forecasting performance. Specifically, we predict that the strategic coverage 
choice corresponds with a superior forecasting performance, where analyst utilize their 
experience related to reporting frequency. Previous literature has shown variation in the quality 
of analysts’ forecasts. In particular, numerous analysts providing more accurate forecasts than 
others (Mikhail, Walther, & Willis, 1997; Hong & Kubik, 2003; Clement, 1999). Some of these 
studies have found that analyst experience is an important determinant in explaining this 
accuracy variation (i.e., more firm- and industry-specific experience improves accuracy), while 
other studies failed to establish this relation. For instance, Clement (1999) suggests that general 
experience, defined as the time interval between the first and latest earnings forecast 
announcement date of the analyst, is detrimental in explaining forecast accuracy. Moreover, he 
identifies the specificity with respect to analyst forecasts. In particular, firm-specific 
 experience, which describes the number of prior years, an analyst issues a forecast for a specific 
firm. We build on these studies and propose that the disclosure frequency-type specific 
experience influences the coverage decision and subsequently, enables analysts to provide 
more accurate forecasts.  
 
H3: Frequent analysts, relative to infrequent analysts, provide significantly lower forecast 
errors for firms that experience a reporting frequency change following the TD. 
 
3. Data 
In this section we describe our data sources, sample selection criteria, and computation details 
of key variables. We also show summary descriptive statistics for the samples we use in our 
analyses. Table 1 summarizes our variables and data sources. 
 
3.1. Sample Selection 
For research setting, we use the staggered adoption differences in financial reporting frequency 
of EU companies, over the years 2003-2013. Prior to the TD implementation between 2004 
and 2007, firms were only mandated to report on an annual basis. The first reporting frequency 
changes in the EU were experienced by cross-listed firms. Phrased differently, all newly listed 
firms (local or foreign firms) on the NYSE had to report quarterly financial reports since 1934 
(SEC, 1934). The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) further reinforced the quarterly 
reporting regime in 1969. As a result of these regulatory changes in the US, numerous EU 
firms, listed on American exchanges, were already reporting on a more frequent basis before 
2004 and relative to their non-cross-listed counterparts in Europe. Consequently, the regulatory 
setting, before and around the TD, provides important conditions to test the impact of 
disclosure frequency changes on analysts’ coverage decisions. Notably, the sample period also 
aims to exclude potential factors of the Transparency Directive Amending Directive (TDAD), 
which was introduced in 2013. The regulatory introduction of the TDAD simplifies several of 
the requirements that were initially introduced by the EU. Respectively, we limit our sample 
to 2003 until 2013 to avoid the interference of this deregulation with our analysis. However, 
our subsequent robustness tests focus on the TDAD sample period from 2013 until 2018 and 
the respective implications of this deregulation. More importantly, our sample setting provides 
several key benefits. First, the mandatory (and voluntary) adoption of changing reporting 
frequencies occurs over time, which creates an ideal setting for a DiD design. Particularly, the 
cross-listing requirements of US exchanges leads to a substantial set of firms that already report 
 on a quarterly basis. This set of organizations serves as a natural group of control firms in our 
DiD design. Further, the mandatory requirement of more frequent reporting, following the TD, 
helps to reduce potential endogeneity concerns associated with a voluntary reporting frequency 
change of firms. Lastly, the choice for this specific time period stems from the substantial 
regulatory changes and the current debate in the US to abolish the quarterly reporting 
requirement. More specifically, a comparable analysis cannot be conducted in the US due to 
the constant quarterly-reporting requirement since 1934 by the SEC.  
We start our sample selection by identifying 4,232 publicly listed European firms 
during 2003 – 2013 from the Compustat – Wharton Research Data Services. Within the 
databases, we obtain the reporting frequency and other firm-related characteristics. To match 
the firm sample to the I/B/E/S detail file, we use the respective CUSIP, and obtain all analyst 
forecasts within the sample period from January 2003 through November 2013. We lose 575 
firms with no CUSIP match on I/B/E/S. Further, we delete 225 firms for which we cannot find 
reporting frequency information. Our final sample includes 3,462 publicly listed firms and 
1,052 distinct analysts with a total of 19,160 initiations and 8,294 terminations for all sample 
firms. Lastly, we incorporate instances of coverage and non-coverage. By construction, 
research that studies coverage on a firm-by-firm basis excludes data from analysts who decide 
not to cover a given firm. However, this data is clearly important when one aims to model a 
coverage choice decision.   
 
3.2. Model Equation and Multivariate Regression 
In this section, we provide multivariate analyses of analysts' coverage decisions, namely, 
initiation and termination decisions of analysts. We study analysts' coverage decisions using a 
Probit model on the choice sample. In all multivariate models, we control for time, country and 
industry effects by including forecast end year, country and industry indicator variables. 
Further, we two-way cluster the standard errors at year level to control for cross-sectional and 
time-series dependence. Our regression model results in the following equation: 
 !"#$#%$#&"'() = +, + +./"%012$3'() ∗ 5&2$() ∗ 367%$78() +	∑ ;<=&"$6&0'()<<<>, +∑ ?@A@>. + ∑ BC.D,EC>.DDF + ∑ GHIJK>LMN)O@' + P'(),                                                      (1) 
 
where the dependent variable is !"#$#%$#&"'() for the coverage likelihood analysis. For 
the subsequent analysis, we measure the level of existing analyst coverage for each of our 
 initiations. Specifically, we distinguish between initiations with no prior coverage (new 
initiations) and those with prior coverage (subsequent initiations). Initiations that occur at firms 
with (no) existing coverage are denoted by the indicator variable !"#$#%$#&"_R7S'() 
(!"#$#%$#&"_TUV'()) Subscript % stands for analyst, W for firm, $ for the forecast quarter, # for 
industry, X for year and = for country. We follow prior research and control for various firm, 
analyst, and brokerage characteristics, as defined in Table 1, that affect the analyst and her 
coverage decisions. The industry controls are constructed on 3-digit SIC codes. The main 
variable of interest, +., estimates the effect of an analysts’ frequent reporting expertise for 
treatment firms following the reporting frequency change around the Transparency Directive. 367%$78@ represents the indicator variable for a treatment firm (reporting frequency change 
due to the Transparency Directive); 5&2$@,) represents an indicator variable that equals 1 for 
periods after the treatment year, and 0 for periods prior to the introduction year. Importantly, 
we visually establish the soundness of the parallel trend assumption.  
 
3.3. Effects of frequency-type specific knowledge on forecast accuracy 
We continue our empirical analyses with a model that includes the analyst type indicators, 
firm-specific and industry-specific knowledge, and other additional control variables. This 
model is shown below, in Eq. (2) 
 Z&67[%2$_5'() = +, + +./"%012$3'() ∗ 5&2$() ∗ 367%$78() +	∑ ;<=&"$6&0'()<<<>, +∑ ?@A@>. + ∑ BC.D,EC>.DDF + ∑ GHIJK>LMN)O@' + P'(),                            (2)        
 
where Z&67[%2$_5'() is the absolute forecast error (or directional forecast bias) for 
analyst a’s forecast of firm f’s earnings in t; the control variables are defined in Table 1. 367%$78@ represents the indicator variable for a treatment firm (reporting frequency change 
due to the Transparency Directive); 5&2$@,) represents an indicator variable that equals 1 for 
periods after the treatment year, and 0 for periods prior to the treatment year. 
 
3.3. Variables 
Most research related to the determinants of analyst coverage links firm characteristics (e.g.; 
size, performance and the number of analysts that follow the firm) (Bae, Stulz, M., & Tan, 
2008). Other studies incorporate a broader perspective and focus on brokerage- and analyst-
specific elements, such as brokerage size and specialist status (Clarke, Khorana, Patel, & Rau, 
 2007). Due to the analyst-firm focus of our study, we aim to measure all variables in a pair 
setting, at each respective quarter. These variables comprise the reporting frequency, industry 
specialization and firm-specific experience between the analyst and the covered firm. For our 
main variables of interest, frequent analyst (infrequent analyst), equals one if an analyst’s 
portfolio proportion of frequent firms relative to all firms is greater (smaller) than the median 
portfolio proportion prior to the Transparency Directive. Notably, we compute the portfolio 
proportion based on the ratio of quarterly to all the other firms in an analyst’s portfolio. To 
account for industry- and firm-specific expertise, we apply the methodology used by Gilson et 
al. (2012) to classify an analyst as a specialist, if she/he covers at least five firms in the given 
firm's industry. Similar to the industry-specific classification, the firm-specific experience 
variable accounts for the difference between the forecast period end date and the first forecast 
by the analyst (McNichols & O'Brien, 1997). Lastly, for each analyst-pair at quarter t, we 
identify the number of analysts following the firm, as well as the size of the portfolio and 
brokerage house. We further describe the variables and data sources in Table 1. 
 
3.4. Summary statistics, Univariate analysis and Correlation 
Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics by year for our sample firms. Our final sample 
incorporates 3,399 unique firms, of which 1,877 have analyst coverage over the sample period. 
We note the highest number of firms in the end of the TD implementation period in 2007 at 
2,830, of which 1,672 are covered. The number of analyst’s peaks at the same time with 1,688 
active analysts. The drops of firm and analyst numbers in 2011 onwards may reflect the 
European sovereign debt crisis2 starting in 2009 and slowly unfolds over the subsequent years. 
The number of initiations follows a similar pattern, increasing until 2007 and then remaining 
relatively stable over the following years. With respect to the averages, experience gradually 
increases over time. However, in the years 2015 and onwards, less-experienced (more 
experienced) analysts enter (leave) the market. Similarly, portfolio size increases over time, 
while remaining relatively constant after 2011. More specifically, frequent and infrequent 
analyst portfolios gradually increases over time, however, the portfolio size of frequent analyst 
is considerably larger than the portfolio of infrequent analyst. We further verify this with a 
 
2 The European sovereign debt crisis is a multi-year debt crisis in the European Union that followed the 
global financial crisis in 2008. The collapse of banking systems across Europe has led to a loss of confidence 
in European businesses and economies. Respectively, capital market participants will increase risk aversive 
behavior or withdraw resources (Becker & Ivashina, 2017). 
 univariate analysis in Table 3. The result shows a significant difference in portfolio sizes 
between the two analyst types in both time periods. Particularly, the finding suggests that 
frequent analysts continuously add reporting frequency increasing firms to their portfolio after 
the Transparency Directive, while the portfolio of infrequent analysts remains relatively 
constant. We further include the descriptive statistics of our variables in Table 2 - Panel B. 
Notably, the portfolio proportions indicate the respective change following the Transparency 
Directive. Specifically, the overall proportion matches the Post-TD proportion due to the time 
period related to each variable. Furthermore, Table 4 also shows this correlation between the 
overall and post-TD proportion. With respect to our main variable Frequent Analyst, we 
employ the median of the pre-period proportion to isolate the effect of the regulatory change 
on analysts’ coverage decisions. This variable definition aims to capture the expertise in 
different reporting frequency levels and employs the pre-TD proportion as a benchmark. As 
displayed in Table 2, the mean and median were considerably lower before relative to the post-
period, which follows the main objective of the Transparency Directive. Furthermore, the 
majority of our sample incorporates relatively experienced analysts. Lastly, the specialist 
variable also indicates that approximately half of the analysts acquire industry expertise. This 
specialist status positively correlates with the portfolio size of the analyst, which indicates that 
greater industry expertise incentives analysts to cover and follow more firms relative to non-
specialist.  
 
4. Analysis of disclosure frequency and analyst coverage decisions 
4.1. Determinants of frequent analyst coverage likelihood 
Table 5 illustrates our Probit regression results of the effect of reporting frequency on frequent 
analyst’s coverage likelihood of firms in our choice sample. As previously mentioned, we do 
not report the coefficients of year, industry and country effects, although we control for all 
three in all of our regressions. Table 4 further supports our premise that an analyst's expertise 
in disclosure frequency, increases the likelihood that she will cover a firm, controlling for other 
determinants of this decision. In all columns, we use the indicator Frequent Analyst to proxy 
for the expertise in disclosure frequency and find positive and significant coefficients for 
initiations. Furthermore, our main interaction variable of interest, Frequent Analyst * Treated 
* Post, provides consistent and significant evidence for H1. In Column (1), the interaction term 
coefficient of 0.93 suggests an odd ratio of 2.53 (=exp(0.54)), meaning that frequent analysts 
are 150% more likely to initiate new coverage for a disclosure frequency changing firm after 
the Transparency Directive compared to infrequent analysts. This finding provides important 
 insights on how disclosure frequency and related informational advantages influence the 
coverage decision-making process of analysts. With respect to the other interaction terms, 
Treated * Post shows a highly significant and negative coefficient. More specifically, the 
respective odd ratio indicates an 80% lower likelihood of new coverage for firms that increase 
reporting frequency after the Transparency Directive. This finding is in line with our premise 
and suggests that frequent analyst strategically select their coverage targets to fully utilize their 
informational advantage, while other analyst may not be able to seize this opportunity 
(Crawford, Roulstone, & So, 2012). However, opposing other studies, firm-specific 
Experience seem to be less likely to initiate new coverage with an odd ratio of 0.02, indicating 
specialist are 5% less likely to initiate new coverage for firms (O'Brien & Tan, 2015). 
Potentially, these analysts prefer more established companies and their stature allows them 
more selectivity. Lastly, the analyses in Column (2) investigates the termination decision of 
analysts. The main focus variable provides significant and negative results, which indicates 
that the disclosure expertise of frequent analysts also has an effect on the termination decisions.  
Consistent with the argumentation of H2, the result follows the general premise that the 
greater information environment Post-TD should not positively influence the termination 
behavior of frequent analysts for treated firms. In particular, frequent analysts prefer the greater 
reporting frequency and consequently, have more incentives to keep coverage for respective 
firms. On the contrary, the termination likelihood of infrequent analysts significantly increases 
for firms that switch reporting frequency in response to the TD. This could result from the 
overall increase in disclosure quality and the decrease in information asymmetry for these 
firms. Alternatively, infrequent analysts may start to restructure their portfolios and based on 
newly available information. Overall, our results support the conjecture that disclosure 
frequency significantly increases analyst coverage likelihood, controlling for specialist status, 
as well as other coverage determinants. In particular, the increase in likelihood for initiations 
suggests that frequent analysts possess the ability to gather and create information) in a more 
efficient manner following the Transparency Directive. Consistent with the previous literature 
on the determinants of the analyst coverage, Table 4 also shows that IFRS and Treated 
positively influence the initiation behavior (Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2003; Crawford, Roulstone, 
& So, 2012; Branson, Guffey, & Pagach, 1998). These positive results follow the reduction in 
information asymmetry related to the three variables. For instance, IFRS and the associated 
regulatory changes aim to harmonize accounting standards and respectively reduce differing 
information environments across countries.  
 
 4.2. Analysts’ contribution to the existing information mix of the stock price  
Table 6 displays our findings to determine whether the information effects of coverage 
initiations vary based on the level of existing coverage at the time of the initiation. Specifically, 
we aim to identify what type of information frequent (infrequent) analysts primarily produce 
in the coverage process of firms that increase their reporting frequency in response to the TD. 
We employ the methodology by Durnev, Morck, Yeung, & Zarowin (2003), who proxy firm-
specific information and its impoundment into the price formation process via the change in 
idiosyncratic volatility. In contrast, we capture the respective change in industry and market-
wide information by the change in stock return synchronicity. Several studies in the past have 
employed this measure to check for the relation between a firm’s stock returns and market and 
industry returns (Durnev et al, 2003; Crawford et al. , 2012). For instance, Roll (1988) found 
that stock return synchronicity is negatively associated with the amount of firm-specific 
information being impounded into individual stock prices. We explain the measures in more 
detail in Table 1. We interpret the results in Table 6 as indicating that, on average, frequent 
analysts (Frequent Analyst * Treated * Initiation_New) significantly reduce the amount of 
firm-specific information, when initiating coverage at firms with no prior coverage. Prior 
literature interprets this reduction as either an increase in industry and market-wide information 
or additional noise impounded in the stock price. While the former is consistent with analysts 
gathering information that is less costly to acquire, the alternative  noise contribution may 
actually decrease the market efficiency (Crawford et al., 2012). However, as displayed in Table 
7, frequent analysts that initiate coverage at firms with existing coverage (Frequent Analyst * 
Treated * Initiation_Sub)  include significantly more firm-specific information into the covered 
firm’s stock price. Consistent with Durnev et al. (2003), these results indicate that frequent 
analysts only initiating coverage if they have the expertise and relevant firm-specific 
information to share with investors since industry- and market-related information has already 
been provided by other analysts. This analysis collaborates our initial argumentation that 
frequent analysts possess greater levels of reporting disclosure expertise and respectively, are 
more efficient in the firm-specific information collection for firms that change their reporting 
frequency in the TD period.  
 
5. Forecasting implications of the Transparency Directive 
In the previous section, we identify the impact of reporting disclosure frequency on analysts' 
coverage likelihood. Subsequently, we illustrate the implications of these coverage decisions 
on analyst’ forecast performance.  
  
5.1. Forecast Performance of Frequent Analyst 
In our first model specification, the primary variable of interest in this specification is the 
interaction term - /"%012$	31\7 ∗ 5&2$ ∗ 367%$78'(). With this variable, we test the expertise 
of the specific analyst type on the forecast accuracy of frequency switching firms in the Post 
Transparency Directive period. Following the previous models, we expect a negative 
coefficient on this interaction term for frequent analysts. This result could be interpreted as the 
respective forecasting advantage related to the frequency type-specific knowledge, succeeding 
the strategic coverage choice of the analyst. On the contrary, we expect decreases in the 
forecasting performance for the infrequent analyst group, because of their informational 
advantage loss related to their disclosure frequency expertise and a subsequent adjustment 
phase to the new informational environment. With respect to the second specification, we do 
not specify a direction for the expected forecast bias. This mostly results from inconclusive 
evidence for both argumentations. The superior information of frequent analysts may enable 
them to gather and utilize information (i.e.; firm- and/or industry-specific information) in a 
timelier and more cost-efficient manner, however, the resulting earnings forecast can be either 
more optimistic or pessimistic. For the former direction, the superior expertise can enable 
frequent analysts to gather more crucial information and respective provide better and more 
positive forecasts. On the other hand, this better information gathering process could also 
unfold important information that makes earnings forecasts more negative for this analyst type 
(Hong & Kubik, 2003; Das, Levine, & Sivaramakrishnan, 1988). 
Turning to our primary regressions, we see in Table 8 - Columns (1) that the coefficients 
and significance levels of the interest variables confirm our predication. Most specifically, the 
variable Z67]U7"$	/"%012$ ∗ 5&2$ ∗ 367%$78 indicates that frequent analysts, following their 
previous coverage decision, provide superior earnings forecast for future periods, relative to 
infrequent  analysts. This improved performance will mainly result for the reporting frequency 
specific expertise that this type of analyst incorporates in the forecasting process. However, on 
average, frequent analysts only provide superior forecasts for the treated firms in the Post-TD 
period. Potential explanations for this increase could relate to the greater information 
asymmetry prior to the TD implementation. Importantly, this should not be interpreted as a 
unsuccessful implementation of the Transparency Directive, because this regulatory change 
was aimed to reduce myopic behavior and inefficiencies in resource allocation (Fu, Kraft, & 
Zhang, 2012).  Furthermore, the improvements for these firms could occur gradually, which 
 may result in an initial increase in analysts’ forecast errors. With respect to the control 
variables, we see that Specialist, Analyst Following, IFRS, Portfolio Size and Brokerage Size 
negative influence the forecast error, which is consistent with prior literature (Mikhail, 
Walther, & Willis, 1997; Clement, 1999, Dowen, 1989). Lastly, the results further indicate that 
with Volume and Size, one can expect increases in the forecast error. The common factor in in 
these variables relates to complexity and uncertainty. For instance, greater trade or more 
complex global operations aggravate analyst’s ability to predict future performance of firms 
due to the limited resource to process all the necessary information (Clement, 1999). Column 
(2) provides the regression results for the forecast bias specification. As previously stated, we 
do not expect one direction to be more pronounced in our model. Respectively, the results 
indicate no significant relationship between the frequent analysts’ disclosure advantage for 
switching firms and forecast bias. A potential explanation may relate to a negating effect of 
optimistic and pessimistic analysts. This argumentation follows the direction of the remaining 
interaction terms. Noticeably, all analysts provide significantly more pessimistic forecast for 
treated firms in the Post-TD period. The control variables follow the expected direction that 
we outline in the previous section.  
Overall, we find significant evidence for the superior forecasting performance of 
frequent analysts, after their strategic initiation choices of treated firms, relative to infrequent 
analysts. More specifically, frequent analysts provide more accurate future earnings forecasts 
for firms that were affected by the Transparency Directive implementation between 2004 and 
2007.  
 
6. Robustness tests  
In the above sections, we show the relationship between reporting disclosure frequency 
increases, analyst type-specific experience and analysts' coverage likelihood. To check the 
robustness of our results, we employ alternative choice decisions and alternative proxies for 
our variables. We have identified some of these alternatives previously in footnotes and explain 
them in more detail below. 
 
6.1. Effects of deregulations on analyst coverage likelihood 
The period that follows our sample period also includes another important regulatory change 
that may influence analysts’ coverage. Other scholars have already investigated deregulation 
settings (i.e.; industry deregulations) and the respective effects on forecasting performance. For 
instance, Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Sharma (2011) exploit industry deregulations, as their 
 research setting, to investigate the change in competition (market power) on analysts’ forecasts 
accuracy and bias. The authors find that analysts’ forecast accuracy declines significantly in 
the post-deregulation period, while analyst optimism increases significantly. Moreover, they 
find that deregulated industries are also able to attract a greater coverage level. This finding 
contradicts previous assumptions of analysts’ incentive to strategic select firms with more 
market power because they are easier to forecast. We aim to complement these findings, by 
investigating how analysts’ reporting frequency expertise affects the coverage decisions after 
a deregulatory change. Our deregulatory change relates to the abolishment of several key 
policies of the Transparency Directive. The Transparency Directive Amending Directive 
(TDAD), introduced in 2013, aims to correct several issues of the Transparency Directive. In 
particular, legislators removed the quarterly reporting and other administrative requirements as 
a response to myopic managerial behavior and real earnings management incidents in quarterly 
reporting settings. We aim to exploit this exogenous shock and the respective endogenous 
coverage choice to verify whether our specific analyst types decide to (not) cover specific firms 
in the Post-TDAD period.  
 We display the respective output for each analyst type in Table 9. However, before the 
discussion of the results, several changes to key independent variables were implemented. In 
particular, the Treated and Post variable change to Treated Amend and Post Amend. Table 1 
describes them in more detail; however, the change mainly relates to the respective regulatory 
change. Table 8 – Column (1) and (2) displays the coverage implications for frequent analysts. 
Our main focus lies on the respective analyst types and their coverage decisions for firms that 
switch to a less frequent reporting regime in the Post-TDAD period. Table 9 – Column (1) 
shows significant change in the coverage initiations of frequent analysts for firms that 
implement the regulatory requirements of the TDAD. In particular, frequent analysts are 
significantly less likely to initiate coverage for firms that decrease their reporting frequency in 
response to the TDAD. More specifically, the odd ratio of 0.19 (exp(-1,63)) indicates that 
frequent analysts are 80% less likely to coverage firms that reduce their reporting frequency 
after 2013. This follows our premise of the reporting expertise, possessed by frequent analysts, 
that significantly diminishes with the implementation of the TDAD. In other words, the 
introduction of greater information asymmetry, through the regulatory change, refrains 
frequent analysts to initiate coverage for treated firms. The control variables primarily indicate 
that industry- and firm-specific experience as well as existing analyst coverage reduces the 
initiations likelihood in the respective sample period. Column (2) illustrates the termination 
behavior of frequent analysts in the TDAD sample period. While the non-significance of the 
 three-way interaction indicates that frequent analysts do not terminate their coverage of 
reporting frequency decreasing firms in the post-TDAD period, the significantly positive 
coefficient of Frequent Analyst * Post Amend supports the aforementioned restructuring 
prediction. Particularly, frequent analysts seem to be more likely to terminate their coverage in 
the post-TDAD period. Conclusively, these findings suggest that the constant portfolio size of 
frequent analysts, in combination with the significant increase in both initiations and 
terminations likelihood by frequent analyst, indicates portfolio restructuring by this analyst 
group. All in all, deregulation provides consistent results that follow the aforementioned 
argumentation and further reveal potential restructuring activities of analysts, following the 
deregulatory changes.  
 
6.2. Analyst Target Price Error 
Earnings forecasts are an important channel through which information intermarries distribute 
information, nonetheless, target prices are another common measure of the type of information 
that analysts provide. We adapt Equation (2) for this analysis and replace the right-hand side 
with the Target Price forecast accuracy. We measure TP forecast accuracy by the magnitude 
of the TP error, TPE, which is the absolute difference between the target and the actual stock 
price at the end of the 12-month forecast horizon, scaled by the stock price at the TP issue date. 
The results in Table 10 provide similar results. Noticeably, the magnitude of the forecast error 
reduction is stronger. Moreover, the control variables follow similar pattern, as in Table 8. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Despite abundant evidence regarding the effect of analyst coverage on covered firms and on 
analysts' employers, we have an incomplete understanding of determinants that incentivize an 
individual analyst to initiate or terminate the coverage of a particular firm. Based on the idea 
that reporting frequency creates varying information environments, which improves the 
analyst's information about the firm, we examine reporting frequency as a determinant of the 
analyst's coverage decision. We divide the analyst in respective groups based on their portfolio 
composition to account for expertise in specific disclosure frequency types. We further control 
for industry specialization, firm-specific experience, and other common determinants of 
coverage in our study. After controlling for these factors, we identify that frequent analysts are 
150% more likely to initiate new coverage for a disclosure frequency changing firm in the Post 
TD period, compared to infrequent analysts. The opposite holds for the infrequent analysts, 
this analyst type refrains from initiations in the Post-TD period. More specifically, they 
 regulatory change leads to the loss of their reporting frequency-specific informational 
advantage, which subsequently reduces the benefits of covering firms that are required to 
increase disclosure frequency. While several control variables are of great importance, the 
respective industry and firm-specific experience variables provide the most significant 
coefficients. To collaborate these findings, we further identify the primarily information type 
that frequent and infrequent analysts produce during their coverage decision. We show that 
frequent analysts primarily incorporate firm-specific information into the stock price formation 
process, which follows our argumentation of their greater expertise with respect to high 
reporting frequency. Moreover, the strategic coverage behavior of analysts also reflects in their 
subsequent forecasting performance. In particular, frequent analysts are able to provide more 
accurate forecast for the treated firms, following the Transparency Directive introduction. 
Lastly, we add another novel dimension to the study by exploiting the one-time events of 
deregulations to ascertain and verify the impact of reporting frequency changes on analysts’ 
coverage decisions. The exogenous shock (provides us with a clean natural experiment and a 
unique opportunity to study the disclosure frequency adjustments on analysts’ coverage 
behavior. We examine our choice sample and identify that frequent analysts avoid coverage 
decisions in the post-deregulation period, while terminations remain unaffected. This result 
may relate to the consecutive exposure and adjustment to a quarterly reporting setting. In other 
words, the frequent analysts avoid the increase in information asymmetry and refrain from new 
initiations. While prior scholars of coverage behavior examine the number of analysts that 
follow a firm in aggregate, we look at detailed characteristics of the specific analyst-firm pair. 
The exogenous regulatory change provides us with an ideal setting to examine this detailed 
coverage decision and allows us to isolate the behavioral differences between our two analyst 
groups. Although our conjecture about the information advantage of analyst types is based on 
prior research and logically could apply to any analyst-firm pair, we cannot be certain that our 
results generalize to other regulatory settings. In conclusion, we examine the impact of 
different reporting frequency expertise of analysts after a regulatory change and find that 
analysts benefit from information environments that closely match their type of expertise. 
These benefits include the strategic coverage of certain firms and subsequently, the superior 
forecast performance via more accurate forecasts. Lastly, we believe that the investigation of 
analyst’s decision-making processes remains a viable research area for the future. Analyst’s 
coverage decisions have important implications for a variety of stakeholders. For example, 
greater coverage enables better funding conditions for firms, more efficient resource allocation 
by shareholders and more informed capital markets benefit regulators and other stakeholders.  
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 Table 1 - Variable descriptions 
    This table describes our dependent and independent variables. We obtain all data from I/B/E/S, unless specified 
otherwise. Variables subscripted with %W (W) are measured by analyst-firm (firm) in quarter $. 
Variable Description and data sources !"#$#%$#&"'() Indicator variable equal to one if I/B/E/S analyst % initiates coverage on a firm W	in 
quarter $, 0 otherwise; !"#$#%$#&"_R7S'() Indicator variable equal to one if I/B/E/S analyst % initiates coverage on a firm W	with 
no existing coverage in quarter $, 0 otherwise; !"#$#%$#&"_TUV'() Indicator variable equal to one if I/B/E/S analyst % initiates coverage on a firm W	with 
prior coverage in quarter $, 0 otherwise; 376`#"%$#&"'() Indicator variable equal to one if I/B/E/S analyst % terminates coverage on a firm W	from 
quarter $ − 1 to $, 0 otherwise; /"%012$	31\7'( Indicator variable equal to one if I/B/E/S analyst %‘s portfolio proportion of quarterly-
reporting firms is greater than the median of the Pre-Transparency Directive portfolio 
proportions, 0 otherwise; 367%$78( (Amend) Indicator variable equal to one if firm W changes its reporting frequency to quarterly 
from quarter $ − 1 to $ in response to the Transparency Directive (Amendment), 0 
otherwise; 5&2$( (Amend) Indicator variable equal to one for all firms W, after the implementation of the 
Transparency Directive (Amendment), 0 otherwise; T\7[#%0#2$'() Indicator variable equal to one if analyst % covers at least five firms in the same I/B/E/S 
industry as firm W in the prior year prior quarters $ − " date, 0 otherwise; Z#6`	cd\'() Time interval in years between analyst %'s first forecast and the forecast period end date 
in the I/B/E/S detail file; ef$	=%\() Firm W's market cap, denominated in millions of Euro, at quarter $; We use the natural 
log form of this variable in our multivariate regressions; 5&6$W&0#&_T#g7'() Number of firms in analyst %'s portfolio in quarter $. We use the natural log form of this 
variable in our multivariate regressions; i6&f76%j7_T#g7'() Number of analysts under brokerage house V in quarter $. We use the natural log form 
of this variable in our multivariate regressions; !ZkT'( Indicator variable equal to one when firm implements IFRS, 0 otherwise; /"%012$	Z&00&S#"j'() Number of analysts following firm W in quarter $. We use the natural log form of this 
variable in our multivariate regressions; l&0U`7'() Trading volume for quarter $ (in millions); T#g7'() Firm W's total assets, denominated in millions of Euro, at quarter $; We use the natural 
log form of this variable in our multivariate regressions; ∆T1"[ℎ() Following Morck et al. (2000), we regress daily returns on the value-weighted market 
return and the value-weighted two-digit SIC industry return. The R2 is algorithmized 
and ∆T1"[ℎ() is the change in synchronicity from quarter $ − 1 to quarter $. ∆!8#&21"[6%$#[() Following Durnev et al. (2003), we regress a firm’s total returns on the value-weighted 
market return and the value-weighted two-digit SIC industry return. We then scale the 
error variance over the total variance of a firm’s total returns and ∆!8#&21"[6%$#[() is 
the change in idiosyncratic volatility  from quarter $ − 1 to quarter $. 
 Table 2 - Descriptive information on sample firms 
   Our overall sample contains 3,399 European Firms during 2003–2018. Respectively, our sample includes 814 
analysts, who collectively provide 17,396 initiations and 7,106 terminations over the sample period. Furthermore, 
we indicate the average portfolio size for the respective analyst type and the overall experience. 
Panel A: Final sample by year 















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
2003 2475 1961 300 9.88 3.06 3.41 2.72 
2004 2341 1035 244 6.60 5.58 5.38 6.08 
2005 2418 1552 445 7.03 7.60 9.15 5.99 
2006 2716 1688 660 6.88 8.26 9.52 7.03 
2007 2830 1498 542 6.94 8.05 9.70 7.33 
2008 2450 856 522 8.21 8.60 9.57 7.96 
2009 2387 929 437 9.44 8.13 9.73 7.82 
2010 2431 721 461 9.89 7.22 9.16 6.68 
2011 2252 620 478 10.24 8.49 10.02 7.13 
2012 2510 959 510 11.16 9.30 11.65 8.05 
2013 1740 844 367 11.98 8.88 11.15 7.76 
2014 1823 877 300 12.45 8.55 10.70 7.51 
2015 1942 919 451 8.02 8.49 10.52 7.79 
2016 1754 855 585 7.35 8.46 10.09 7.88 
2017 1842 1095 292 6.65 8.79 10.15 7.94 
2018 1990 987 512 7.08 8.96 10.48 8.17 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Median Min Q1 Q3 Max Std. Dev. 
Frequent Analyst 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 
Portfolio Proportion 0.57 0.64 0.00 0.18 0.93 1.00 0.36 
Pre-TD Proportion 0.40 0.41 0.00 0.12 0.65 1.00 0.30 
Post-TD Proportion 0.59 0.67 0.00 0.19 0.95 1.00 0.37 
Specialist 0.59 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 
Firm Experience 8.73 7.00 0.00 3.00 1.00 22.00 4.24 
Mkt Cap 1154.40 438.81 244.23 355.71 911.76 1711.97 941.90 
IFRS 0.97 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.16 
Portfolio Size 7.90 5.00 1.00 3.00 9.00 104.00 7.74 
Brokerage Size 434.90 329.40 1.00 165.00 612.10 1134.00 314.22 
Analyst Following 7.65 7.00 1.00 4.00 10.00 33.00 5.19 
 
 
 Table 3 - Univariate analysis 
   The respective comparison defines analysts and their type before the Transparency Directive introduction. First, 
we group the 814 analysts into the frequent and infrequent analysts based on the portfolio compositions and 
subsequently, investigate the portfolio size of each type prior and following the implementation of the Transparency 
Directive. Finally, we compare the average portfolio size in each category to obtain initial insights of the coverage 
mechanism that occur around the regulatory change.  
Panel A: Subsample comparison – portfolio size for the choice sample 
 Frequent (A) Infrequent (B) (A) – (B) No of observations 
   Difference p-value  
      
Pre-Transparency 
Directive 6.41 5.51 0.90 0.11 29,911 
      
Post-Transparency 
Directive 9.13 7.19 1.94 0.00 48,029 
      
Difference (a) – (b) 2.72 1.68 1.04 0.00  
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00   
      
No of observations 61,277 16,663    
***,**,* denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and the 10% level, respectively.  
 Table 4 - Correlation information on sample firms 
   Our sample contains 3,399 European Firms during 2003–2013 with available data. Respectively, our overall sample includes 814 analysts, who collectively provide 17,396 
coverage on these firms, where we differentiate a coverage between the first earnings forecast (no prior coverage exists) and subsequent coverage (prior coverage exists). 
Further, the total number of terminations amounts to and 7,106 over the sample period. The proportion variables account for the differing analyst portfolios and serve as a 


















Frequent Analyst            
Frequent 
Proportion 0.59* 
          
Pre-Proportion -0.12 -0.11          
Post- Proportion 0.39 0.82** -0.08        
Specialist 0.20 -0.27 -0.13 -0.23       
Firm Experience 0.37 -0.04 -0.16 -0.15 0.31      
Mkt Cap -0.61** -0.84** -0.02 -0.68** -0.25 -0.24     
IFRS -0.33 -0.19 -0.19 -0.26 -0.04 -0.12 0.18    
Portfolio Size 0.28 -0.21 -0.15 -0.21 0.93** 0.47** -0.22 -0.06   
Brokerage Size 0.09 0.17 -0.11 0.10 -0.21 -0.08 -0.22 -0.15 -0.23  
Analyst 
Following 
-0.34 -0.21 -0.14 -0.21 -0.42* -0.16 0.47* 0.00 -0.47* 0.19 
***,**,* denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and the 10% level, respectively.  
 Table 5 - Determinants of analyst coverage likelihood. 
    The table shows the impact of frequent analysts' information advantage, with respect to reporting frequency, on 
their decisions to cover firms. Our sample of European analyst-firm pairs fall within 2003–2013. The sample is a 
choice sample of analyst-firm observations, which includes 814 analysts and 3,399 sample firms. All models are 
estimated with Probit regression. We define the variables in Table 1. The models include industry, year and country 
indicators, but we do not report their coefficients. We report robust z-statistics, adjusted for one-way clustering on 
year level, in parentheses. 
 Initiations Terminations 
 (1) (2) 
Frequent Analyst 0.266*** -4.045*** 
 (3.398) (-4.182)*** 
Frequent Analyst * Treated 0.537*** 4.762*** 
 (3.116) (6.229)*** 
Frequent Analyst * Post -0.992 2.716*** 
 (-1.542) (2.786) 
Treated * Post -1.701*** 0.36 
 (-4.244) (1.188)*** 
Frequent Analyst * Treated * Post 0.939** -4.356*** 
 (2.172) (-5.559) 
Treated -0.163 -0.48* 
 (-0.591) (-1.702) 
Post 0.449 -0.148 
 (0.814) (-0.737) 
Specialist -0.11 -0.21 
 (-0.904) (-1.174) 
Firm Experience -0.027** -0.073*** 
 (-2.185) (-3.238) 
Market Cap 0.648 -1.776 
 (0.359) (-1.388) 
IFRS 0.115 0.299** 
 (0.855) (2.364) 
Portfolio Size -0.283*** -0.404** 
 (-4.833) (-2.313) 
Brokerage Size -0.203** 0.047 
 (-2.07) (0.52) 
Analyst Following -0.15* -0.213* 
 (-1.949) (-1.871) 
Volume -0.022 -0.024 
 (-0.486) (-0.91) 
Firm Size -0.038 0.018 
 (-0.279) (0.386) 
Constant 5.128 5.662* 
 (1.041) (1.657) 
Year Effects Included Included 
Industry Effects Included Included 
Country Effects Included Included 
   
Observations 129,063 129,063 
Log Likelihood -25,348.41 -16,149.22 
***,**,* denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and the 10% level, respectively.  
 Table 6 - Determinants of analyst coverage likelihood – New Initiations. 
        The table shows the impact of frequent analysts' information advantage, with respect to reporting frequency, on 
their decisions to cover firms. We differentiate between two types of initiations. Specifically, initiations without prior 
and initiations with existing coverage. Our sample of European analyst-firm pairs fall within 2003–2013. The sample 
is a choice sample of analyst-firm observations, which includes 814 analysts and 3,399 sample firms. All models are 
estimated with Probit regression. The models include industry, year and country indicators, though we do not report 
their coefficients. We report robust z-statistics, adjusted for one-way clustering on year level, in parentheses. 
 Δ in Stock Synchronicity Δ in Idiosyncratic Volatility 
 (1) (2) 
Frequent Analyst -0.041 -0.000 
 (0.025) (0.000) 
Frequent Analyst * Treated 0.035 0.000 
 (0.026) (0.000) 
Frequent Analyst * Initiations_New 0.095** 0.000 
 (0.048) (0.000) 
Treated * Initiations_New 0.048 0.000*** 
 (0.047) (0.000) 
Frequent Analyst * Treated * Initiations_New 0.022 -0.001 
 (0.050) (0.000) 
Treated -0.050* -0.000 
 (0.026) (0.000) 
Initiations_New -0.253*** 0.001*** 
 (0.045) (0.000) 
Specialist 0.004 0.000 
 (0.007) (0.000) 
Firm Experience 0.001 -0.000** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Market Cap -0.162*** 0.001*** 
 (0.055) (0.000) 
IFRS -0.006 0.000*** 
 (0.009) (0.000) 
Portfolio Size 0.004 -0.000* 
 (0.006) (0.000) 
Brokerage Size -0.006* 0.000*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) 
Analyst Following 0.028*** -0.000*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) 
Volume 0.004*** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Firm Size 0.005** -0.000*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) 
Constant 0.288* -0.001** 
 (0.157) (0.000) 
Year Effects Included Included 
Industry Effects Included Included 
Country Effects Included Included 
   
Observations 60,736 60,736 
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.079 
***,**,* denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and the 10% level, respectively.  
 Table 7 - Determinants of analyst coverage likelihood – Subsequent Initiations. 
        The table shows the impact of frequent analysts' information advantage, with respect to reporting frequency, on 
their decisions to cover firms. We differentiate between two types of initiations. Specifically, initiations without prior 
and initiations with existing coverage. Our sample of European analyst-firm pairs fall within 2003–2013. The sample 
is a choice sample of analyst-firm observations, which includes 814 analysts and 3,399 sample firms. All models are 
estimated with Probit regression. The models include industry, year and country indicators, though we do not report 
their coefficients. We report robust z-statistics, adjusted for one-way clustering on year level, in parentheses. 
 Δ in Stock Synchronicity Δ in Idiosyncratic Volatility 
 (1) (2) 
Frequent Analyst -0.015 0.000 
 (0.025) (0.000) 
Frequent Analyst * Treated 0.020 -0.000 
 (0.025) (0.000) 
Frequent Analyst * Initiations_Sub 0.007 -0.000 
 (0.055) (0.000) 
Treated * Initiations_ Sub -0.003 -0.000** 
 (0.055) (0.000) 
Frequent Analyst * Treated * Initiations_ Sub -0.015 0.000** 
 (0.058) (0.000) 
Treated -0.018 0.000 
 (0.026) (0.000) 
Initiations_ Sub 0.068 -0.000 
 (0.053) (0.000) 
Specialist 0.003 0.000 
 (0.007) (0.000) 
Firm Experience 0.001* -0.000** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Market Cap -0.237*** 0.001*** 
 (0.059) (0.000) 
IFRS -0.007 0.000*** 
 (0.009) (0.000) 
Portfolio Size 0.008 -0.000*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) 
Brokerage Size -0.003 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.000) 
Analyst Following 0.029*** -0.000*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) 
Volume 0.005*** -0.000* 
 0.008*** -0.000*** 
Firm Size (0.002) (0.000) 
 (0.002) (0.000) 
Constant 0.290* -0.001*** 
 (0.169) (0.000) 
Year Effects Included Included 
Industry Effects Included Included 
Country Effects Included Included 
   
Observations 60,736 60,736 
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.065 
***,**,* denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and the 10% level, respectively.  
 Table 8 - Effect of reporting frequency change on forecasting performance 
    The table shows the impact of reporting frequency changes, around the Transparency Directive introduction, on 
frequent analysts’ forecasting performance. Our sample of European analyst-firm pairs fall within 2003–2013. The 
sample includes all observations before the introduction of the Transparency Directive Amending Directive in 2013. 
We define the variables in Table 1. The models include industry, year and country indicators, though we do not report 
their coefficients. We report robust t-statistics, adjusted for two-way clustering on firm and year level, in parentheses. 
 Forecast Error Forecast Bias 
 (1) (2) 
Frequent Analyst -0.007* 0.015* 
 (-1.818) (1.791) 
Frequent Analyst * Treated 0.003 -0.017*** 
 (1.284) (-3.133) 
Frequent Analyst * Post 0.014*** -0.003 
 (3.541) (-0.393) 
Treated * Post 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.62) (-0.494) 
Frequent Analyst * Treated * Post -0.011*** -0.006 
 (-2.665) (-0.635) 
Treated -0.002 0.023*** 
 (-0.98) (4.741) 
Post 0.035 -0.028 
 (1.452) (-0.558) 
Specialist -0.001*** 0.003*** 
 (-2.854) (3.636) 
Firm Experience 0.000*** 0.000* 
 (5.005) (1.927) 
Market Cap -0.272*** 0.277*** 
 (-108.92) (52.643) 
IFRS -0.002*** 0.002** 
 (-5.221) (2.262) 
Portfolio Size -0.001*** 0.000 
 (-5.036) (-0.827) 
Brokerage Size -0.001*** 0.003*** 
 (-5.396) (9.693) 
Analyst Following 0.000 0.000 
 (0.235) (-0.557) 
Volume 0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (55.248) (-24.928) 
Firm Size 0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (56.7) (-29.096) 
Constant 0.733*** -0.742*** 
 (100.882) (-48.412) 
Year Effects Included Included 
Industry Effects Included Included 
Country Effects Included Included 
   
Observations 58,423 210,017 
Adjusted R2 0.397 0.107 
***,**,* denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and the 10% level, respectively.  
 Table 9 - Determinants of analyst coverage likelihood after the TDAD 
    The table shows the impact of frequent analysts' information advantage, with respect to reporting frequency after 
the Transparency Directive Amending Directive, on their decisions to cover firms. Our sample of European analyst-
firm pairs fall within 2013–2018. The sample is a choice sample of analyst-firm observations, which includes 633 
analysts and 676 sample firms. All models are estimated with Probit regression. We define the variables in Table 1. 
The models include industry, year and country indicators, though we do not report their coefficients. We report robust 
z-statistics, adjusted for one-way clustering on year level, in parentheses. 
 Initiations Terminations 
 (1) (2) 
Frequent Analyst -1.936*** -1.158** 
 (-4.442) (-2.141) 
Frequent Analyst * Treated 1.073** 0.145 
 (2.551) (0.392) 
Frequent Analyst * Post 1.25* 1.484** 
 (1.824) (2.422) 
Treated * Post 1.762*** 0.088 
 (3.498) (0.168) 
Frequent Analyst * Treated * Post -1.633*** 0.238 
 (-2.742) (0.508) 
Treated -1.224*** -0.248 
 (-3.38) (-0.794) 
Post -0.616 -2.105*** 
 (-1.147) (-3.099) 
Specialist -0.261* -0.322 
 (-1.726) (-1.376) 
Firm Experience -0.006 -0.126*** 
 (-0.31) (-3.887) 
Market Cap 5.579*** -2.935** 
 (3.594) (-2.371) 
IFRS 0.67*** 0.146 
 (3.936) (0.837) 
Portfolio Size -0.181 -0.409** 
 (-1.558) (-2.155) 
Brokerage Size 0.019 0.081 
 (0.284) (0.926) 
Analyst Following -0.301** -0.166 
 (-2.244) (-1.483) 
Volume 0.035 -0.008 
 (0.92) (-0.325) 
Firm Size -0.278*** 0.02 
 (-2.68) (0.217) 
Constant -11.715** 9.728*** 
 (-2.357) (3.021) 
Year Effects Included Included 
Industry Effects Included Included 
Country Effects Included Included 
   
Observations 53,820 53,820 
Log Likelihood -2921.17 -16,149.22 
***,**,* denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and the 10% level, respectively.  
 Table 10 - Effect of reporting frequency change on forecasting performance 
    The table shows the impact of reporting frequency changes, around the Transparency Directive introduction, on 
frequent analysts’ forecasting performance. Our sample of European analyst-firm pairs fall within 2003–2013. The 
sample includes all observations before the introduction of the Transparency Directive Amending Directive in 2013. 
We define the variables in Table 1. The models include industry, year and country indicators, though we do not report 
their coefficients. We report robust t-statistics, adjusted for two-way clustering on firm and year level, in parentheses. 
 Target Price Error Target Price Bias 
 (1) (2) 
Frequent Analyst 0.001 -0.09 
 (0.419) (-0.085) 
Frequent Analyst * Treated 0.000 0.374 
 (-0.098) (0.57) 
Frequent Analyst * Post 0.002 0.381 
 (0.897) (0.325) 
Treated * Post 0.002 0.099 
 (0.787) (0.09) 
Frequent Analyst * Treated * Post -0.004* -0.256 
 (-1.828) (-0.211) 
Treated 0.001 -0.287 
 (0.829) (-0.493) 
Post -0.01 -0.377 
 (-0.763) (-0.467) 
Specialist 0.001*** -0.184** 
 (4.817) (-2.483) 
Firm Experience 0.000*** 0.001 
 (3.531) (0.121) 
Market Cap 0.055*** -9.551*** 
 (41.503) (-12.752) 
IFRS 0.002*** -0.092 
 (8.19) (-0.806) 
Portfolio Size 0.000 0.025 
 (-1.136) (0.351) 
Brokerage Size 0.001*** 0.053 
 (8.754) (1.212) 
Analyst Following 0.000*** -0.17*** 
 (3.575) (-3.385) 
Volume -0.001*** 0.251*** 
 (-27.02) (14.266) 
Firm Size -0.001*** 0.049 
 (-21.632) (1.593) 
Constant -0.149*** 27.258*** 
 (-38.269) (11.838) 
Year Effects Included Included 
Industry Effects Included Included 
Country Effects Included Included 
   
Observations 58,423 58,423 
Adjusted R2 0.09251 0.027 
***,**,* denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and the 10% level, respectively. 
